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Abstract— We consider the problem of identifying the insider-
based attacks in the form of jammers in multi-channel wireless
networks, where jammers have the inside knowledge of frequency
hopping patterns and any protocols used in the wireless network.
We propose a novel technique, called “alibi”, to identify the insider-
based jammers in multi-channel wireless networks. Alibi is a form
of defense whereby a defendant attempts to prove that he or she
was elsewhere when the crime in question was committed. Starting
from such a simple concept, we develop an alibi framework to
cope with insider-based jamming attackers in various situations
including single jammer, lossy channels, non-colluding jammers
and colluding jammers. We evaluate the framework according to
several properties such as accuracy, detection time & network
performance in ns2 simulation and analysis. The overall results
of these protocols show a promising research direction to deal with
insider-based jamming attacks.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communications are inherently vulnerable to jam-
ming attacks due to the open and shared nature of wireless
medium. In the jamming attack, an attacker injects a high
level of noise into the wireless system which significantly
reduces the signal to noise and interference ratio (SINR) and
probability of successful message receptions.
While there are various ways to carry out jamming attacks
(cf. see IX), we consider a so-called insider-based jamming
attack as follows. In an insider-based jamming attack, there
are several nodes getting compromised either before the
deployment or during the operation of the network. These
compromised nodes become means to jam the network. The
dangers of this type of attacks are two-fold. First, the attackers
have any shared knowledge supposed to remain secret within
the network such as shared keys, shared hopping pattern and/or
any protocols used by the network. Second, the attackers can
be very stealthy if they want to stay undetected as long as
possible to do further damage to the network. The stealthy
nature of the attack also helps the attackers to conserve the
energy if the devices are powered by batteries.
Most of the work in the jamming defense literature can
only deal with outsider-based jamming attacks (cf. see IX).
By “outsider”, we mean the attackers with zero knowledge
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of any shared secrets among nodes in the network. One of
the most effective ways to prevent such an outsider jammer is
spread spectrum technique. By hopping the carrier frequency
(frequency-hopping spread spectrum - FHSS) or spreading
its signal in time (direct-sequence spread spectrum - DSSS),
the network can force the jammer to spend several-fold more
power than if spread spectrum were not used [1][2]. However,
spread spectrum does not work if the attacker knows the
hopping-pattern (HP) of the FHSS or the pseudo-noise chip
(PN) sequence of DSSS. An insider-based jammer can easily
obtain the shared hopping pattern of the network and jam very
effectively. Thus, dealing with insider-based attackers is far
more challenging than the outsider-based ones.
In this paper, we focus on the problem of identifying the
insider-based jammers. Note that there is a difference between
detection and identification. Detection is a weaker concept
than identification. Detection only means that a jammer exists.
Identification means that a node X is the jammer. We propose
a novel technique, called “alibi”, to identify insider-based
jammers in multi-channel wireless networks. By definition,
“alibi is a form of defense whereby a defendant attempts
to prove that he or she was elsewhere when the crime in
question was committed”. In the context of jamming attacks,
honest nodes try to obtain alibis showing that they were
doing legitimate actions observed by some witnesses while the
jamming action took place. From this core concept of alibi,
we develop a framework, called alibi framework, including
a set of randomized algorithms and protocols to identify
insider-based jammers. The key principle in building the alibi
framework is that there has to be a significant difference in the
way of obtaining alibis between honest nodes and attackers.
For example, alibi can be defined in the way that only honest
nodes can obtain alibis while attackers cannot obtain any
alibis. In this way, when all honest nodes obtain at least one
alibi, attackers are identified.
Even though alibi framework starts from a simple concept,
there are numerous challenges to make it work in the context
of identifying insider-based jammers in multi-channel wireless
networks. First, because there is no clear distinction between
a “normal-corrupted” packet (i.e. a packet corrupted by an
unintentional collision) and a jammed packet (i.e. a packet
corrupted by an intentional jamming action), we have to deal
with “false” alibis. False alibis are alibis that can be falsely
generated from misidentified packet corruption events. Thus,
attackers can exploit this fact to get false alibis and stay
undetected. Second, alibi is susceptible to slander attacks. In a
slander attack, if the behaviors of honest nodes are completely
known by the attackers, the attackers can deterministically
avoid committing jamming actions whenever those honest
nodes may potentially obtain alibis. By doing this strategy,
the victim nodes will never be able to obtain any alibis and
thus become as misidentified as attackers. Third, there might
be multiple attackers in the network. A jam event caused
by one attacker can help another attacker to get an alibi. If
these attackers collude, it becomes much more challenging.
The attackers can collude to generate “fake” alibis, i.e. alibis
that are generated from non-existing jamming events. They
can also share alibis which can make them as good as honest
nodes. Last but not least, alibi framework has to be able
to cope with these challenges without much performance
degradation of the network.
In our previous work [3], we only deal with the case
of a single insider-based jammer - the simplest case of a
challenging problem. In this paper, we deal with the case of
multiple attackers. We will show, by detailed analysis and
simulation evaluation, how the alibi framework copes with
lossy channel condition, multiple non-colluding attackers
and multiple colluding attackers with slander attacks.
Our analysis and simulation evaluation will cover a set of
properties of alibi framework including accuracy, detection
time and network performance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We start
with the system model including network model, jammer
model and problem formulation in Section II. We present
the general alibi framework including the basic ideas and
desired properties for any alibi-based protocols in Section III.
In Section IV, we start the discussion on the case of single
jammer with under lossy channels. In subsequent sections,
we discuss the case of non-colluding multiple attackers in
Section V and the case of colluding attackers in Section
VI. in Section VII, we present a general statistical detection
technique called Sequential Hypothesis Testing that is used as
the basic statistical detection technique in alibi framework. We
evaluate the framework in Section VIII. Finally, we conclude
our paper in Section X.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Network Model
We consider a multi-channel wireless network where some
nodes in the network are insider-based jammers. We assume
that these jammers can affect at least several nodes (if not all)
of the considered wireless network. Specifically, the network
has n nodes N1..Nn in which a node can send/receive to
several other nodes as shown in Figure 1(a). Nodes in the
network have a set of C orthogonal channels Γ = {γ1, ...γC}
that they can switch to. These channels may not be necessarily
contingent in frequency. Each node is equipped with a single
transceiver. That means, a node cannot send and receive
simultaneously. There will be also non-negligible transmit-to-
receive and receive-to-transmit turn-around time. The channel
switching delay of a node is also assumed to be non-negligible.
Nodes in the network use a multi-channel MAC protocol
such as Slotted Seeded Channel Hopping (SSCH) [4] or
McMAC [5]. The main reasons for the suggestion of these
multi-channel MAC protocols are:
1) These MAC protocols improve the capacity of the wire-
less networks. They generally do not require any special
hardware other than a commodity wireless cards such as
802.11.
2) They are multiple-rendezvous protocols in which mul-
tiple device pairs can make agreements simultaneously
on distinct channels [6]. This eliminates the problem
of single control channel bottleneck - a sweet spot for
the jammer to target on. This is very important because
a jammed control channel may drastically reduce the
effective throughput close to zero [7][8].
However, in this paper, for the sake of simplicity of the
analysis and description of the alibi framework, we assume
a simplified SSCH as follows. The time is divided into time
slots of size s. n slots form a round. In each round, on each
channel, n slots are assigned randomly to n nodes in such a
way that a node is not assigned on two different channels in
one time slot and any two nodes are not assigned to the same
time slot and the same channel. We assume each node knows
the exact schedule of any other nodes. Figure 1(b) illustrates
a case of 5 nodes scheduled on 3 channels.
For a node A wanting to communicate with a node B, A
changes its schedule to B’s schedule and start communicating
with B. When A and B are on the same channel, they can use
any contention-based protocol such as CSMA/CA [9] or Black
Burst [10] to exchange messages. For example, A senses the
channel first and starts sending its message. B replies an ACK
on the receipt of the message from A.
It is important to emphasize that the multi-channel MAC is
not mandatory in our alibi framework. Our alibi framework
can work on any other single-channel or multi-channel MAC
protocols as long as nodes have several channels other than
the data channel to switch to. Also, even though we consider
the single-hop wireless networks, our technique is applicable
to multi-hop wireless networks. Specifically, for any multi-hop
wireless networks, we can apply jamming detection techniques
for multi-hop wireless networks such as [11] and [12] to
locate jamming areas of wireless networks. Each jamming area
can be modeled as single-hop network model above where
jammers can be identified by our techniques.
B. Jamming Model
A packet consists of a set of symbols. A jammed packet
has several corrupted symbols whose locations are unknown.
However, the corruption of a packet can be detected by check-
ing its cyclic redundancy check (CRC). Corrupted packets,
due to either jamming or unintentional interference, are still
delivered to the upper layer to provide information on reasons
of corruption [13]. We assume that any two receivers listening
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Fig. 1. Network Model
on the same channel at the same time will receive the same
packet content with probability pr, regardless whether the
packet is corrupted or not. However, for the sake of simplicity
of our analysis, we assume pr = 1.
C. Jammer Model
To damage a packet, a jammer just needs to cor-
rupt a few symbols. Even though, error correcting code
(ECC) may be used to provide stronger jamming-resistant
communication[14], an insider-based jammer is assumed to
know how many corrupted symbols are sufficient to fail the
ECC. The jammer is assumed to be able to jam multiple
channels by doing channel switching. That means, a jammer
may jam one channel, which takes him sometime to corrupt
few symbols, and switch to another channel to do jamming.
However, we assume within a time slot s, jammers cannot
jam the whole channel set Γ. This is a necessary condition
for any in-band anti-jamming defenses. Otherwise, no in-
band communication is possible and thus no in-band jamming
defense is possible.
D. Detection Model
We consider both centralized and distributed detection
model. In the centralized detection model, we assume there
is a trusted entity G where nodes can report to. This entity
can sit on the wireless network such as the base station or can
be in the Internet. We also assume that every node knows the
public key kG of G. This will make sure nodes can have a
secure communication to G when necessary. In the distributed
detection model, each node will participate in the process of
verifying and generating alibis.
E. Problem Formulation
Attackers are nodes in the network. Let us denote K > 1
the number of attackers. The problem is to identify attackers
with respect to properties such as accuracy, detection time and
network performance. We will consider both non-colluding
and colluding attackers.
III. ALIBI’S FRAMEWORK
A. Alibi
Alibi is a form of defense whereby a defendant attempts to
prove that he or she was elsewhere when the crime in question
was committed. The alibi framework is built up from this core
concept. Our alibi definition is as follows.
Definition 1 (Alibi & Defendant). An alibi for a defendant is
a proof including time and channel information which shows
that the defendant was doing legitimate actions at the time the
jamming action was committed. A legitimate action is either
sending or receiving a packet.
Definition 2 (Proof & Witness). A witness is a node who
shows a proof of a defendant doing an action at a specific
time.
In our alibi framework, a defendant cannot claim an alibi by
himself. Rather, witnesses generate alibis for defendants from
collected proofs. Thus, an increasing number of witnesses for
an alibi also increases the trustworthy of that alibi.
Definition 3 (Sending-based alibi (S-alibi)). A sending-based
alibi for a node (referred to as S-defendant) shows that the
defendant was observed, by several witnesses (referred to as
S-witnesses), sending an uncorrupted packet over one whole
time slot in one channel at the time the jamming action
took place in another channel also observed by several other
witnesses.
This definition exploits the fact that a jammer cannot jam
one channel and send an uncorrupted packet of one time slot
in another channel simultaneously.
Definition 4 (Receiving-based alibi (R-alibi)). A receiving-
based alibi for a node (referred to as R-defendant) shows that
the defendant was receiving a jammed packet, by showing
a (hashed) packet content that matches with the (hashed)
packet content received by other witnesses (referred to as R-
witnesses).
This definition exploits the fact that a node cannot both
send and receive a packet simultaneously. In the receiving-
based alibis, an R-defendant of a jamming event is also an
R-witness of other R-defendants of the same event. In other
words, a group of nodes that can show the same hash of a
jammed packet content in the same time slot will all receive
R-alibis.
B. The principle in using alibis to identify attackers
The key principle in using alibis to identify attackers is that
there has to be significant difference of alibis obtained by good
nodes and attackers. The difference can be deterministic such
as “only good nodes can obtain alibi while attackers cannot”
or statistical such as “a good node statically obtains higher
number of alibis than an attacker”. With these differences,
as time goes on, the attackers will be eventually identified.
If attackers can manage to remove the differences, the alibi
framework will fail to differentiate the good nodes and the
attackers. Thus, it is very important to have the right definition
and implementation of alibis. Let us now discuss the properties
of S-alibis and R-alibis with respect to this principle.
C. Advantages and disadvantages of S-alibis and R-alibis
S-alibis have a very important property: non-shareable.
Once a defendant obtains a S-alibi from a set of witnesses,
only he can use that alibi. S-alibi of X is similar to “X did an
action at time T and place P , seen by some witnesses while
the crime action was committed at time T and place Q”. Thus,
X cannot commit the crime action at time T and place Q. No
one other than X can use X’s S-alibis. R-alibi is shareable
as two different nodes can use the same R-alibi to make any
same claim.
S-alibi, however, is harder to obtain because defendants have
to actually send a packet that has to be successfully received
by a set of witnesses. If packets intended to send for obtaining
S-alibis are jammed such that sender identities embedded in
those packets are undecodable, they become useless for S-alibi.
R-alibi is easier to obtain in this sense. A node only needs to
switch to listen to a particular channel. If the jamming event
happens on that channel and there are enough witnesses, all
witnesses including itself can obtain R-alibis. This will become
a big advantage in dealing with slander attacks discussed in
the next section.
D. Slander attacks
If the behaviors of defendants are deterministic, attackers
can do slander attacks on any victim nodes as follows. When-
ever victim nodes become defendants, the attackers will not
commit any jamming actions. By doing this, the victim nodes
cannot obtain any alibis and thus have no difference with the
attackers. This violates the principle of alibi framework. Thus,
to avoid slander attackers, we have to introduce randomness
into defendants’ behaviors.
However, because S-defendants have to actually send pack-
ets to obtain alibis, introducing randomness in their behaviors
also introduce additional collisions in the network. The colli-
sions not only degrade the network performance but also cause
additional “fake” alibis because collisions can be considered
as “unintentional” jamming actions. This is not a problem for
R-defendants as they only have to listen to channels. Thus,
even though there might be ways to mitigate the problem of
S-alibis to cope with slander attacks such as the one proposed
in [15], we will only discuss R-alibis in this work due to
its advantage in dealing with slander attacks. Thus, alibis
refer to R-alibis from now on, unless specified.
E. A basic alibi-based protocol
When an honest node is idle in any time slots (i.e. no
sending or receiving), it switches to a uniformly random
channel in Γ with probability pw to become an R-witness
(also R-defendant). For a node, increasing pw will increase
the probability of being R-witness and potentially increase
the probability of getting alibis but also decrease its network
performance. For example, if a node has always a packet to
send, pw = 0.2 means it will lose 20% of its either sending
or receiving. Thus, pw can be used as a parameter to control
the trade-off between the probability of getting alibis and the
degradation of the network performance.
When a node Ni becomes a R-witness in a time slot t on
channel c, it will receive the whole packet content p regardless
of whether the packet is decodable or not. It will get the hashed
content of the received packet by using any good hash function
H (e.g. CRC, SHA1 or MD5) and create a proof m in the
following form:
m = (Ni, t, c,H(Ni, t, c,H(p))).
Any node that wants to verify this message has to know
H(p). This will ensure that when message m is relayed to
any unintended nodes, only nodes that have H(p) can verify
that Ni has H(p). This property is useful when we want a
distributed verification of R-alibis.
However, when m is sent to the central detector G, Ni has
to include H(p) encrypted by the public key kG of G. Thus,
the message m destined to G will be as follows.
m = (Ni, t, c, < H(p) >kG ,H(Ni, t, c,H(p))).
F. Desired Properties
Desired properties for any alibi-based protocols are as
follows.
1) Detection time: This property is concerned about the
time to detect the attackers. Specifically, any alibi-based pro-
tocols must show that the time to detect is bounded.
2) Accuracy: This property is concerned about the false
alarm and miss detection. Specifically, any alibi-based proto-
cols must show that P [false alarm] and P [miss detection]
are bounded.
3) Availability/Network performance: This property defines
fraction of time the channels is available for communication.
Intuitively, the more the attackers jam the channels, the less
availability of the channels is and the faster the attackers get
detected. Thus, this becomes the trade-off for the attackers.
G. Two variants of alibi protocols
In this paper, we consider two alibi-based protocols. The
first protocol is a centralize protocol in which we assume
proofs obtained by any nodes are sent to G. G will collect all
proofs and generate alibis. For the simplicity of the analysis,
we assume any node can send a message to G immediately.
Thus, this centralized protocol is an optimal protocol with
respect to all properties and is referred to as Omniscient
protocol.
The second protocol is a distributed protocol. Essentially, in
this protocol, last proofs are included in the messages sent by
defendants and appropriately combined to create alibis. Thus,
this protocol is also referred to as Proof-propagation protocol.
IV. DEALING WITH A SINGLE ATTACKER UNDER LOSSY
CHANNELS
Lossless channel is the perfect situation for alibi framework
as any corrupted packets are considered as results of jamming
actions. Furthermore, whenever the attacker does a jamming
action, there is non-zero probability for each honest node to get
an R-alibi. In addition, an attacker cannot be able to obtain
any R-alibis because that requires the attacker to send and
receive at the same time. Thus, it becomes obvious that once
each honest node obtains an alibi, the attacker is identified.
The analysis of this simplest case can be found in [3].
In reality, wireless channels are always lossy. There are
two main issues for alibi framework when channels become
lossy. First, a lossy event may be falsely treated as a jamming
event. Second, due to such mistreatment of loss events, an
jammer may accidentally get “false alibis” if he follows the
alibi protocol. Because we assume that there is no difference
between a lossy event and a jamming event, we accept the
fact that there might be “false alibis”. In other words, the
jammer can obtain “false’ alibis but so can honest nodes. Thus,
the fundamental difference between an honest node and the
jammer is that honest nodes can obtain both “true alibis”, i.e.
alibis from the jamming event, and the “false alibis” while the
jammer can only obtain the “false alibis”. By exploiting this
fact, it appears that the rate at which an honest node obtains
both types of alibis might be higher than the rate at which the
jammer obtains false alibis. Once we ensure that any honest
node can obtain alibis faster than the attacker, we can use
any statistical detection techniques to differentiate the honest
nodes and the attacker. This will be discussed in Section VII.
In what follows, we are going to analyze under what
condition an honest node can obtain faster alibis than the
jammer. Let us denote pj the jamming probability in each time
slot of the jammer and pl the loss probability in each time slot.
Apparently, pj must be less than 1 so that the jammer has
some idle slots to follow the protocol to obtain false alibis.
Furthermore, we assume that the jamming events and lossy
events are disjoint. This is because if a jamming action takes
place on a corrupted packet caused by a channel loss is not
beneficial for both the attacker (no further damage done) and
honest nodes (no extra alibi created).
For an honest node, in a time slot, it gets an alibi (of
any types) when there is either a jamming event or a lossy
event in one channel on which it is an R-defendant. Thus, the
probability of an honest to obtain an R-proof (and thus R-alibi
since there is only one attacker) is C(pl/C+pj/C)pw/C. For
the attacker, in a time slot, it gets an false alibi when there is
a lossy event in one channel on which it is an R-defendant.
Therefore, the probability of the attacker to obtain a false R-
alibi is Cpl/C(1− pj)/C.
To make a good node have faster rate of obtaining alibi than
the attacker, it is required that (pl + pj)pw > pl(1 − pj), or
pj > pl
1−pw
pl+pw
. Thus, if the attacker jams more than the term in
the right hand-side, he will obtain alibis slower than an honest
node and will get caught eventually. That means, by having
the jamming rate less than the right term, the attacker can
have a stealthy jamming strategy in which he can do certain
damage to the network without getting caught.
From the point of view of an alibi scheme, if the system
wants to detect an attacker with the minimal jamming rate
pminj , pw has to satisfy
pw > pl
(1− pminj )
pl + pminj
.
One important note is that if the attacker has a dynamic
jamming rate pj , then pw has to be adaptive too. However,
this adaptive pw is left as future work.
V. DEALING WITH NON-COLLUDING JAMMERS
Let us assume there K jammers in the system (1 < K < C).
We assume these jammers do not collude by any means. We
also assume that all jammers have the jamming probability of
pj in each time slot. We assume a jammer picks a channel
to jam uniformly in Γ. Furthermore, as similar to the case of
lossy channel, we assume these K jammers will never have
overlapping jamming pattern. We do not consider overlapping
jamming slots because they waste the attackers’ jamming
efforts and will not create any extra alibis for good nodes.
Thus, in every time slot K random but distinct channels are
jammed by K non-colluding jammers.
For a jammed time slot by a jammer, both honest nodes
and the other jammers can get a R-alibi. However, the rate
of obtaining alibis are different for the honest nodes and the
jammers. Similar to the case of lossy channel, we now will
analyze under what condition an honest node can obtain faster
alibis than a jammer.
In any time slot, a good node gets an alibi when there is a
jamming action on a channel and it is an R-defendant on the
same channel. The probability of this event is Kpjpw/C. For
an attacker, the probability to get an alibi is (K − 1)pj(1 −
pj)/C. To make an honest obtain alibis faster than an attacker,
it is required that Kpjpw/C > (K − 1)pj(1 − pj)/C. Thus,
to deal with K attackers with jamming rate pj ,
pw >
(K − 1)(1− pj)
K
. (1)
If pw =
(K−1)(1−pj)
K , it is easy to derive that the average
loss rate is
Kpj
C
(2)
and the average throughput is
(
n−K
n
)(
C − pjK
C
)BW (3)
where BW is the bandwidth of the network (e.g. 11Mbps for
802.11b).
VI. DEALING WITH COLLUDING ATTACKERS
In this case, we assume there are K > 1 multiple attackers
that can collude with each other (1 < K < C). By collusion,
we mean attackers can share any information among them-
selves immediately by any means of communication. There
are several problems when collusion is possible. The first
problem is that attackers can coherently lie about their proofs
(i.e. hashed content of jammed packets) to create “fake” R-
alibis. To cope with this, we require at least K + 1 witnesses
presenting same hashed content of a jamming packet to create
a R-alibi for all witnesses.
The second problem is that attackers can share alibis. For
example, let us consider the case of 2 colluding attackers.
Let us assume one attacker jams the network and the other
attacker collects alibis. If there is no alibi-sharing, the jamming
one can be detected by our previous proposed detection
schemes. However, if alibis are shared to the jamming one,
both attackers can get alibis at the rate of other normal nodes
and thus cannot be detected. In what follows, we will discuss
how to cope with colluding attackers using the concept of R-
chains.
A. R-chains
The alibi-sharing behaviors are possible due to the lack of
the non-shareable property of R-alibi as discussed in Section
III-C. Essentially, a jamming attacker getting shared with an
R-alibi generated on channel c at time slot t can claim his
presence at time t and channel c even though he was not
there. Thus, to cope with this problem, a node has to be able
to explain its presence at time slot t and channel c before
being able to obtain an R-alibi at time slot t and channel c.
For a node to be able to explain its presence at time slot
t and channel c, it has to declare its sequence of being R-
defendant before time slot t. Let us denote R-chain(Ni,s,l) the
sequence of l pairs (c1, s)...(cl, s+l−1) in which Ni becomes
an R-defendant on channel cj at time s + j − 1 (j = 1..l).
Thus, R-chain(Ni,s,l) can be used to verify the validity of any
R-alibi for Ni at any time in between [s, s + l − 1]. In other
words, a witness will only generate an R-alibi for a node Ni
at time slot t on channel c if and only if 1) it receives R-
chain(Ni,s,l) before time slot t and 2) the pair (c, t) exists in
the chain R-chain(Ni,s,l).
R-chain can help to drastically reduce the possibility of
alibi-sharing behaviors of the attackers. Essentially, any two
attackers Nj1 and Nj2 can share an R-alibi at time slot t on
channel c only when (c, t) exists in both R-chain(Nj1 ,t1,l) and
R-chain(Nj2 ,t2,l). Thus, if all nodes (including attackers) are
required to declare their R-chains before trying to obtain any
R-alibis, the attackers cannot share alibis arbitrarily anymore.
Unfortunately, if R-chain of an honest node is known by
attackers, the node is vulnerable to slander attackers (see
Section III-D). Basically, attackers can deterministically avoid
jamming on channel c at time t if (c, t) is in the R-chains of
victim nodes. Thus, victim nodes will not be able to get any
R-alibis. As discussed previously, the only way to cope with
slander attacks is to introduce randomness into R-chains. This
will be discussed in the next section.
B. One-way R-chains
The basic idea to introduce randomness into an R-chain
while still making it verifiable is based on the concept of one-
way chains. One-way chains are widely used cryptographic
primitive such as in Tesla [16].
A one-way chain is generated based on a one-way hash
function F . To generate a one-way chain of length l, we first
randomly pick the last element of the chain sl. Then, we
generate the whole chain by repeatedly applying the function
F l times (i.e. sl−1 = F (sl), sl−2 = F (sl−1) and so on).
Finally, s0 is a commitment to the entire one-way chain. s0
can always be used to verify whether an element belongs to the
chain i.e. any si belongs to a chain if and only if F i(si) = s0.
The chain is released in the order from s0 to sl.
There are several key and useful properties of one-way chain
in our problem. First, each element si in the one-way chain can
be considered as a random value drawn from the output space
of one-way hash function F . Second, once the first element of
the chain s0 is released to the network, any later element of
the chain si (i > 0) cannot be changed and can be verified by
checking whether F i(si) = s0. Third, due to the property of
one-way hash function F , the knowledge of element si does
not reveal any information about sj for any j > i. Lastly
and most importantly, elements of a one-way chain have to be
generated by applying the pre-selected one-way hash function
F and cannot be generated arbitrarily.
In our alibi framework, a one-way chain is used to generate
a one-way R-chain as follows. Time is divided into epochs of
l time slots. An R-chain has a length of l. Each node generates
its R-chain at the beginning of each epoch. To generate an R-
chain of length l, a node Ni randomly selects a value sil . The
whole chain is then generated from sil by repeatedly applying
F in the same way to generate a one-way chain of length l.
For a node Ni, at a time slot t of an epoch (1 ≤ t ≤
l), it uses element sit of the chain to calculate the channel
cit on which it will become an R-defendant at time slot t.
Specifically,
cit = s
i
t mod (C/pw)
where C = |Γ| is the number of channels and pw is the
probability of being a R-defendant. Note that at time slot t
if cit ≤ C, node Ni becomes an R-defendant and stays the
same otherwise. This will ensure that a node will become R-
defendants with probability pw in any time slot t. Figure 2
illustrates the whole process of generating an one-way R-chain
of Ni at the beginning of an epoch.
Similar to Section III-E, the content of a proof of node Ni
at time slot t on channel c now has to include sit. That means,
the proof message is
m = (Ni, t, c, si0, s
i
t,H(Ni, t, c,H(p)))
if it will be used for distributed verification and is
m = (Ni, t, c, si0, s
i
t, < H(p) >kG ,H(Ni, t, c,H(p))).
if it will be sent to the central detector G.
With this scheme, a recipient of a proof message of Ni
can verify whether Ni follows its one-way chain by checking
whether F t(sit) = s
i
0 and c
i
t = s
i
t mod (C/pw). If either
check is failed, the proof message is invalid and will not be
considered for generating alibi.
F(sil)F(sil-1)
silSil-1
F(si2)F(si1)Si0
cil-1
Sil-1
mod 
(C/pw)
…Si1
ci1
Si1
mod 
(C/pw)
Fig. 2. An illustration of R-chain
C. Analysis of one-way R-chains
For R-chains of an honest Ni, we can derive following
properties: 1) sit1 and s
i
t2 , for any t1 6= t2, are independent
and 2) (sit mod (C/pw)) is uniform in [0, ((C/pw) − 1)].
Therefore, an honest node still becomes an R-defendant with
probability pw and behaves like in the previous schemes.
For attackers, under one-way R-chains, collusion is limited.
Specifically, two attackers Ni and Nj can collude at the
overlaps of their R-chains (i.e. at any time index t where
cit = c
j
t ). Thus, if Ni jams at time t and Nj also becomes
an R-defendant on the channel cjt = cit at time t, Nj will get
an R-alibi. Furthermore, if Nj shares this alibi to Ni, they
can achieve both jam and collect alibis at the same time. That
means such a pair of attackers collude in the way just described
is undetectable under the one-way R-alibi scheme. We refer
to this strategy as safe-jam strategy.
We now analyze how much damage attackers can do to the
network under this safe-jam strategy. Let us denote Cw =
C/pw. At any time slot, the probability that a channel has
at least a pair of attackers (i.e. the overlap of two one-way
R-chains of the attackers) is bounded by
qK = 1− (Cw − 1
Cw
)K −K 1
Cw
(
Cw − 1
Cw
)K−1
If the overlap channel of two R-chains of the pair of attackers
is not in Γ, that is not counted as a damage to the network.
Thus, the number of jammed channels in any time slot is
bounded by C(1− qK). We will show later in our simulation
evaluation that the damage done by safe-jam strategy is very
small.
Note that under the safe-jam strategy, it can be easily to
verify that both attackers and honest nodes obtain alibi at the
same rate due to the requirement of K witnesses to generate an
R-alibi. That mean if the attackers decide to jam more than the
safe jamming rate, honest nodes will obtain additional alibis
from the unsafe jam slots. Thus, attackers become detectable
due to lower alibi rate than honest nodes.
VII. ALIBI RATE AND SEQUENTIAL HYPOTHESIS TESTING
Let us assume that in any time slot an honest node obtains
an alibi with probability θ0 and an attacker obtains an alibi
with probability θ1. Intuitively, if θ0 > θ1, an honest node
should be able to obtain faster alibis than an attacker and thus
becomes different from the attacker. In what follows, we use
sequential hypothesis testing to determine whether a node is
good or bad according to its alibi rate.
Let us denote Yi(t) a random process of obtaining alibis
of node Ni. For node Ni, Yi(t) = 0 if no alibi is obtained
and Yi(t) = 1 if an alibi is obtained. Let us denote H0
the hypothesis that a node is an honest node and H1 is the
hypothesis that a node is an attacker. Therefore,
Pr[Yi(t) = 0|H0] = 1− θ0, P r[Yi(t) = 1|H0] = θ0
Pr[Yi(t) = 0|H1] = 1− θ1, P r[Yi(t) = 1|H1] = θ1
The likelihood ratio in an interval [0, T ] is
Λ(Yi) =
Pr[Yi|H0]
Pr[Yi|H1] =
T∏
t=0
Pr[Yi(t)|H0]
Pr[Yi(t)|H1]
where Yi is the vector of events Ni observed in [0, T ] and
Pr[Y |Hi] represents the conditional probability mass function
of the event stream Yi given that Hi is true. Yi is a random
walk. The rule for the detection is as follows: if Λ(Yi) ≥ η1
the hypothesis H0 is concluded. If Λ(Yi) ≤ η0 the hypothesis
H1 is concluded. If η0 ≤ Λ(Yi) ≥ η1, more observations are
needed to make the conclusion.
Let us consider false alarm probability PF and detection
probability PD. Let us denote the user-chosen values of the
false alarm and detection probability are α and β, respectively.
That means, PF ≤ α and PD ≥ β.
Wald [17] shows that if we set η1 ← βα and η0 ← 1−β1−α then
the actual false alarm P ∗F and detection probability P ∗D have
following relationships: 1) P ∗F <
α
β ; 2) 1−P ∗D < 1−β1−α and 3)
1−P ∗D+P ∗F ≤ 1−β+α. From there, the expected detection
time of a bad node is
E[T |H1] =
β ln βα + (1− β) ln 1−β1−α
θ1 ln θ1θ0 + (1− θ1) ln 1−θ11−θ0
.
VIII. EVALUATION
A. Simulation Setup
We evaluate the proposed protocol in ns2 [18]. We imple-
ment the simplified version of SSCH. SSCH is built on top
of 802.11b physical layer. CSMA/CA is used to resolve the
contention of nodes on the same channel. RTS/CTS mode is
disabled. The bandwidth is 11Mbps. Nodes are placed so that
they can communicate with each other in one hop. Each node
has at least one constant-bit rate (CBR) flow to another node.
Each CBR transmits packets of 512 bytes for every 10ms.
This will guarantee that nodes always have packets to send
to fully utilize the network. The network uses 11 channels
to communicate2. The false alarm and detection probability
of the sequential hypothesis testing is set to 0.01 and 0.99,
respectively. We vary the percentage of attackers and jamming
probability of the jammer in the network. The pw is set
according to Equation 1. Each scenario is repeated 10 times
to get the average and deviation.
B. Detection time
As shown in Figure 4(a), when the number of attackers or
the jamming rate increases, the attackers get caught faster. This
matches with the principle of alibi framework: more jammed
packets will lead to more alibis for honest nodes and thus faster
detection time. This also shows the trade-off for the attackers.
C. Accuracy
In our simulation, a false alarm is declared when an honest
is falsely accused as an attacker and a miss detection is
declared when not all attackers are identified after T = 2000.
In all simulation scenarios, we had zero false alarms and
extremely low miss detection rate (less than 0.01%). There-
fore, we do not show them here. This shows an advantage of
sequential hypothesis testing when false alarm and detection
probability are the main parameters.
2SSCH requires the number of channels to be a prime number.
D. Network performance
Figure 3 shows the average throughput and the average loss
rate of network in simulation and in analysis. The difference
between the average throughput in the simulation (Figure 3(a))
and the average throughput in the analysis (Figure 3(b)) is due
to the protocol overhead. Also, it is noticed that the average
loss rate in the simulation (Figure 3(c)) is lower than the
average loss rate in the analysis (Figure 3(d)). This can be
explained as the 20 nodes do not fully utilize all channels
at any time slot while the analysis assume they do. To verify
this, we also plot the average loss rate for the case of 50 nodes
in Figure 4(b) to show that the analysis of the average loss
rate matches with the simulation when the network is heavy-
utilized network.
E. Safe-jam strategy
Figure 4(c) shows the impact of safe-jam strategy on the loss
rate. It is showed that if attackers use safe-jam strategy to avoid
getting caught, the jamming impact to the network is very
small (less than 0.5%). Note that in under the safe-jam strategy,
no nodes were identified as attackers in our simulation.
IX. RELATED WORK
There has been plethora body of research work on jam-
ming attacks and defenses. Jamming attacks can be classified
as proactive or reactive. In the proactive jamming strategy,
the attacker jams the channel without caring about the on-
going communication. A typical example of this type is the
continuous jamming [19][20]. This strategy is the simplest
way to perform a jamming attack. However, it is not energy-
efficient due to the continuous jamming activity. This also
makes the attacker easy to detect. Reactive jamming strat-
egy [21][22][23][24][11][25][26][27][20][28][2], in contrast,
avoids these drawbacks by intelligently listening and jamming
the channel. In this strategy, the attacker keeps listening
and only jams “important” packets such as control packets
[26][27]. Corrupted control packets can drastically reduce the
effective throughput of the communication channel [26][27].
The reactive jamming attack is usually more complicated than
the proactive jamming attack due to the stealthy nature of the
attacker.
Due to the dangers of various jamming attacks, jamming
defenses have gained much attention from researchers. One
of the most effective jamming mitigation is the spread spec-
trum technique. By hopping the carrier frequency (frequency-
hopping spread spectrum - FHSS) or spreading its signal in
time (direct-sequence spread spectrum - DSSS), the network
can force the jammer to spend several-fold more power than
if spread spectrum were not used [1][2]. However, spread
spectrum does not work if the jammer knows the hopping-
pattern (HP) of the FHSS or the pseudo-noise chip (PN)
sequence of DSSS. Once the attacker knows such knowledge,
he can jam the channel very effectively. For example, in 802.11
DSSS the PN is a common knowledge and the attacker can
easily obtain it [9]. By just using the COTS 802.11 cards, the
attacker can easily modify the firmware to have an effective
802.11 jammer [20]. That said, the “outsider” attack (i.e., no
knowledge of the HP or PN) can be defended effectively with
spread spectrum technology while the “insider” attack is still
a problem.
Indeed, dealing with the insider-based attacks, where the
“shared secret” such as shared HP or PN is compromised,
is a challenging problem. This problem exists not only in
the spread spectrum technology but also in other wireless
technologies such as Ultra-wide band (UWB) (pulse-pattern
as the shared secret)[1][29]. Unfortunately, there have been
few research results on this topic. These research results share
the view of considering shared secret as a type of “shared
key” among all nodes. From this point of view, dealing with
a compromised shared key is similar to the key management
in the traditional security literature. Specifically, hierarchical
key management and asymmetrical key schemes have been
explored in [30] and [29]. In [30], the authors extend the idea
from the well-known hierarchical key management to elim-
inate the compromised shared secret. However, this scheme
is designed only for the wireless broadcast network where the
base station can send/receive on different channels at the same
time. In [29], the authors propose a concurrent coding scheme
to form a communication primitive under jamming condition.
This can be used as a way to setup a shared key from the
asymmetric key by using some techniques like Diffie-Hellman
[31]. This scheme, however, is only applicable for point-to-
point communication.
X. CONCLUSION
The problem of identifying insider-based jammers in multi-
channel wireless networks is a challenging problem and has
not been addressed in the literature. We have shown the alibi
framework to cope with this type of attackers. The framework
is built from the core concept of “alibi”, a form of defense
whereby a defendant attempts to prove that he or she was
elsewhere when the crime in question was committed. Even
though started from such a simple concept, alibi framework
has to deal with various challenging scenarios such as lossy
channels, non-colluding multiple attackers and colluding mul-
tiple attackers. We have shown detailed study of properties
of alibi framework including accuracy, detection time and
network performance, by both simulation and analysis. The
overall results show promising research direction of alibi
framework to cope with insider-based jamming attacks.
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